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"Brian Degen, Won't You Please Come Home":
Can the Government Seize Millions of Dollars in
Property Because Its Owner Will Not Return to
the United States for Trial?
by Jay E. Grenig

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5377.

Under certain circumstances, a
fugitive from justice is not permitted
to invoke the jurisdiction and
resources of American courts to
determine his or her rights. The
doctrine, known as the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine, is based
on principles of fairness and, in
essence, says that a person cannot
have it both ways; one cannot flee
justice in one proceeding and ask
for justice in another. This case asks
the Supreme Court to decide if the
doctrine applies to a complicated
set of facts which includes the fact
that the person deemed a fugitive
has been charged in the United
States but not convicted; the fact
that the individual has refused to
submit to trial in the United States;
and the fact that the individual
faces trial in his country of
residence on charges similar to
those pending in the United States.

charges in his country of residence
similar to the charges filed against
him in this country?
FACTS
The Government claims that for
more than 20 years Brian Degen
was one of the leaders of a major
marijuana trafficking operation.
After authorities arrested one of
Degen's alleged co-conspirators and
began an investigation into Degen's
activities but before a grand jury
indicted him, Degen left the United
States and resettled in Switzerland.
In 1989, a Nevada federal grand jury
indicted Degen on various charges
arising from his role in the marijuana
trafficking operation.
Because Degen's father was born in
Switzerland and Degen was born in
California, Degen is a Swiss citizen
as well as a citizen of the United
States. However, the extradition
treaty between Switzerland and the
United States does not require
either country to surrender its own
citizens to the other for purposes of
facing criminal charges. In the years
since his indictment, Degen has not
returned to the United States.

ISSUE
Can a court invoke the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine to take possession of millions of dollars worth
of property from a nonresident citizen who has refused to return to the
United States to confront a criminal
indictment, who has not been
convicted in a United States court,
and who currently faces criminal
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On the same day that Degen was
indicted, the Government filed a
civil forfeiture complaint seeking
possession of and title to various
properties owned by Degen.
(Forfeitureoccurs when a person
loses his or her rights in property as
a result of criminal or quasi-criminal wrongdoing.)
The Government alleged that most,
if not all, of Degen's property should
be forfeited because it can be traced
to or was used to facilitate the drug
trafficking offenses charged in the
criminal indictment. The property,
located in California, Nevada, and
Hawaii, has a value of more than
$5 million.
Degen answered the forfeiture
complaint through counsel. He did
not, however, appear to answer the
criminal charges against him or
make a good faith effort to submit to
the court's jurisdiction in the
criminal case.
The Government sought to dismiss
Degen's claims in the forfeiture proceeding on the ground that he was
and remains a fugitive from justice
in the related criminal prosecution.
Although Degen claimed that the
property in question was acquired
with legitimate funds and supplied
documentation to that effect, the
federal district court held that the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine
barred him from defending his property against forfeiture. 755 F. Supp.
308 (D. Nev. 1990).
Degen appealed to the Ninth Circuit
which affirmed, holding that the
Degen's claims to the property were
properly dismissed under the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
The court observed that Degen
knew that he was under indictment
in the United States and persisted
in his refusal to appear in the criminal case while, at the same time,
attempting to use the judicial sys-

tem to defend against the forfeiture
of his property. These facts were sufficient to invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to preclude Degen
from taking advantage of the judicial
system to defend his property while
flouting that very system in the
criminal case against him. The Ninth
Circuit was unmoved that the fact
that Degen had been arrested by
Swiss authorities, at the apparent
behest of the United States, and
faced trial there on drug trafficking
charges. 47 F.3d 1511 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court now reviews the
Ninth Circuit's application of the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine,
having granted Degen's petition for
a writ of certiorari. 116 S.Ct. 762
(1996).

CASE ANALYSIS
As noted above, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine provides that a
fugitive from justice under certain
circumstances loses the right to call
upon the resources of the courts.
In Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S.
365 (1970), the Supreme Court
explained that an individual should
not be able to take advantage of the
resources of a court to determine his
or her claims, simultaneously flouting the court's authority to decide a
criminal case.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine
is an equitable doctrine of procedure
developed by federal courts in their
capacity to supervise and manage
the proceedings before them. It was
articulated over a century ago by the
Supreme Court in Smith v. United
States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876), when it
was used to dismiss the appeal of a
convicted criminal who became a
fugitive while the appeal of the conviction was pending. The Court considered it unfair that the fugitiveappellant could accept the benefits
from a favorable adjudication of the
appeal while avoiding the consequences of an adverse decision. The

Supreme Court also has held that a
fugitive's escape amounts to a
waiver of his right to appeal; that
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine
serves an important deterrent
function; and that the doctrine
promotes the efficient and dignified
operation of the judicial system.
The application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine by the courts
is discretionary. In other words,
courts are not required to apply
the doctrine, but, in cases in which
it could be applied, courts are free
to consider whether or not the
doctrine is appropriate under the
circumstances presented. OrtegaRodriguez v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 1199 (1993) (the sanction of
disentitlement should not be
wielded indiscriminately as an
all-purpose weapon against defendant misconduct).
The Court also has declined to
apply the doctrine in the case of a
defendant whose conviction has
been reversed or otherwise set
aside, and it is the prosecution, not
the defendant, that seeks review of
that decision. United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 n. 2
(1985). Degen relies on Sharpe,
contending that the Court's
decision in that case strongly
suggests that the disentitlement
doctrine applies only when the
fugitive is the one affirmatively
seeking judicial action.
Several federal courts of appeals
have extended the doctrine beyond
a fugitive's appeal of a criminal
conviction, applying the doctrine
to preclude a convicted fugitive
from participating in civil proceedings not involving forfeiture but
still related to the underlying
criminal charges. For example, in
Conforte v. Commissionerof
Internal Revenue, 692 F.2d 587
(9th Cir. 1982), a taxpayer who
fled after being convicted of crimi(Continued on Page 334)
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nal charges for tax evasion was held
not entitled to appeal the Tax
Court's determination of tax deficiency and penalties. In Doyle v.
United States Department of
Justice, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir.
1981), the court held that a fugitive
who failed to appear for sentencing
was not entitled to obtain his files
from Government investigators
through use of the Freedom of
Information Act. And, in Broadway
v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit
declined to decide an appeal from
an adverse ruling in a civil rights
case that arose out of an illegal
wiretap and brought by a fugitive
who had pled guilty to a charge of
cocaine possession brought as a
result of the same illegal wiretap.
Four federal courts of appeals have
gone further still and have extended
the doctrine to civil forfeiture proceedings involving the property of
both convicted and not-yet convicted fugitives. Those cases hold that a
claimant who is a fugitive in a related criminal proceeding should not
be allowed to defend against forfeiture of his or her property because
the fugitive has disregarded the
authority of the court and, thus,
has waived the right to be heard.
See United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
$129,374 in United States
Currency, 769 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1985); United States v. Timbers
Preserve, 999 F.2d 452 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. One Parcel

of Real Estate at 7707 S.W. 74th
Lane, 868 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, on
the other hand, have declined to
apply the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine to civil forfeiture proceedings involving the property of convicted fugitives or fugitives under
indictment but not yet convicted.
See United States v. $83,320 in
United States Currency, 682 F.2d
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573 (6th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684
(7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
$40,877.59 in United States Currency
32 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1994).
This case takes application of the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine
further yet, applying it in a civil case
seeking forfeiture of millions of dollars in property in the absence of a
criminal conviction and in light of a
pending foreign prosecution that parallels the Government's attempted
prosecution in this country. Focusing
on these unique facts, Degen urges
that the doctrine should be limited
to persons who have become fugitives following a criminal conviction.
He contends that a person should
not be considered a fugitive simply
because he or she declines to travel
to the United States to stand trial in
a criminal case.
Declaring that the use of the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine in civil
forfeiture actions is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decisions
applying the doctrine, Degen also
asserts that a property owner's
status as an not-yet convicted
fugitive in a separate criminal
proceeding does not offend the
dignity of judicial proceedings.
The United States disagrees, arguing
that it is the defendant's status as a
fugitive, whether convicted or not,
that triggers the doctrine. The
Government argues that the
doctrine is based primarily on the
equitable principal that a litigant
should not be entitled to invoke the
protective processes of the judiciary
while simultaneously undermining
its authority by avoiding justice in
a criminal case.
Supreme Court decisions upholding
the use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in cases involving
appeals from criminal convictions
have not been fought on constitu-

tional grounds because a convicted
criminal has no constitutional right
to an appeal. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113
S. Ct. at 1210 (1993) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). On the other hand,
the seizure of assets pursuant to civil
forfeiture has been held to constitute
a deprivation of property, invoking
the quintessential procedural due
process rights of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Michelle's
Lounge, 39 F.3d at 700-701.
Degen argues that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not be
applied in a civil forfeiture action
because doing so would deprive him
of property without due process of
law. Degen says he is entitled to a
pre-deprivation hearing in order to
defend against the action seeking to
,permanently divest him of his
property.
Even if mistaken on his main
arguments, Degen contends that the
Supreme Court should return the
case for further proceedings to
determine if the Government came
to the courts hearing this case with
"unclean hands." Degen maintains
that the United States attorney
misled both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit concerning the
Government's role in securing
Degen's arrest, detention, and
pending prosecution by the Swiss
government.
Contending that Degen should not
prevail on this argument, the
Government maintains that the
factual and legal issues raised in this
regard were not explored in the
lower courts solely because Degen
declined to press the matter.

SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's prior fugitive
disentitlement cases have all
involved proceedings in which
appellants, i.e., persons seeking
redress from a higher court, had
become fugitives by escaping from

Issue No. 7

custody or jumping bail after being
convicted of criminal charges. In
addition, in each case, the fugitive
was seeking reversal of a criminal
conviction. In other words, none of
the Court's cases has involved someone who refused to travel from his
or her country of residence to the
United States for trial.
This case gives the Supreme Court
the occasion to determine whether
or not the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine should be expanded substantially in the manner recognized
by several federal circuit courts of
appeals. The Court has the opportunity to determine whether the doctrine applies to proceedings that do
not involve a fugitive seeking reversal of a conviction; whether it
should apply to a criminal defendant who has not been convicted;
whether the doctrine applies to
someone who has neither escaped
from custody nor jumped bail, but
has refused to return to the United
States from a foreign residence
where the person just happens to be
a citizen; and whether it applies to
proceedings separate from the proceedings from which the person has
become a fugitive.
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If the Court holds for the Government,
the decision will make it easier for law
enforcement officials to seize property
owned by suspected criminals, particularly those who reside in foreign countries. If the Court rules for Degen, the
Government will find it more
difficult to seize property owned by
foreign residents, while criminal
defendants might be given a reason to
flee before trial. The Government,
however, could act to freeze property
and other assets pending the outcome of a criminal case, an action
that would counter the consequences
of a decision favorable to Degen.

ATTORNEYS OF THE
PARTIES
For Brian .. Degen (Lawrence S.
Robbins; Mayer, Brown & Platt;
(202) 463-2000).
For the United States (Drew S.
Days, III, Solicitor General;
Department of Justice;
(202) 514-2217).

AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Brian J. Degen
Public Citizen (Counsel of
Record: Alan B. Morrison; Public
Citizen Litigation Group;
(202) 588-1000);
Gaith R. Pharaon (Counsel of
Record: Richard F. Lawler;
Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan;
(212) 351-3000).
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